Igor Kojadinović
University of Central Florida
I. Introduction
From the moment one is cradled in the arms of one’s mother, a social imprint ensues. The person one is—and becomes—is shaped by familial, social, cultural, and political forces at play within one’s psychological and social structure. This perspective is colloquially known as the “socially extended view of cognition.” It asserts that cognition is not a process which takes place exclusively in one’s head but rather is influenced and shaped through its extension into one’s environment.
Accepting a social theory of cognition can inspire a worldview that broadens our current scope for understanding others. However, such a worldview also gives rise to questions surrounding the role of the individual. As individual intention assumes the role of shared intention through the mechanisms of social interaction, what becomes of individual autonomy, agency, and accountability? In this paper, I will explore several concepts of social cognition. I will argue that such a worldview jeopardizes individual autonomy and propose that it can be reclaimed through self-analysis and accepting ownership of one’s actions. The evidence for the proposal will be demonstrated through exploring the function of inner speech.
II. Negotiating Autonomy in Ideological Structures
In “Cognition as a Social Skill,” Sally Haslanger attempts to understand social [in]justice by unpacking the role that learned normative principles play in reinforcing oppressive ideological structures. Haslanger distinguishes between repressive means of injustice—direct coercion of action or thought—and ideological oppression, executed unknowingly or unwillingly by the subordinated or privileged. Her assertions are premised upon the notion that “fluent participation in any social milieu depends on a practical orientation that enables one to communicate and coordinate” (6). That is, as one is embedded in a particular social structure, one is innately self-motivated to be understood. Accordingly, one acquires and accepts the cultural technē¹ of the social structure one is embedded in. It is through this enculturation² that the individual conforms to understanding and being understood by the environment in which they are situated.
While much of the process of social assimilation takes place on a psychological level, e.g., in observation, speech, and reflection, it is externalized through the proficiency to engage in practices associated with one’s cultural technē. As Haslanger states, “The social meanings we generate and transmit to others with whom we coordinate constitute culture” (8). This contends that meaning (or normative principles) emerges from action and reaction to particular practices, wherein acceptable behavior is rewarded through adoption into the social milieu and poor behavior is rejected. A kind of parasitic relationship takes place: enculturated beliefs and practices proliferate at the expense of the host who, at times, unknowingly carries out the will of ideology. While examples of this can be seen in accounts of generational racism, violence, and addiction, such an account is often criticized for ascribing the individual a passive role. Furthermore, it suggests that ideology and social practices are pre-existing structures which the individual possesses little power to shape (Maiese 342).
Similarly, an enactivist approach to social cognition, as championed by Shaun Gallagher, ascribes importance—though to what extent is contentious—to both the individual and the social infrastructure in which one is embedded. Like Clark and Chalmers’ extended mind theory, the enactivist approach acknowledges a distinct coupling between the individual and social institution. However, unlike extended mind, which attempts to navigate a treacherous line between coupled systems and constitutive features,³ the enactive approach views institutions (e.g., the legal system) as separate entities. For example, when an individual engages with a legal institution to make informed value judgements based on a court of law, they are forming a new coupled system that enables novel cognitive processes that would not otherwise exist. Of coupled systems, Clark and Chalmers remind us, “If we remove the external component the system’s behavioural competence will drop, just as it would if we removed part of its brain.” Nonetheless, the difficulty of accepting the enactivist account lies in the intrinsic value of this statement. That is, if external components like the institution of law are seen as necessary for making ethical value judgements, this implies that one cannot make such judgements independently. This implies that institutional knowledge supervenes upon individual knowledge, further ascribing affordances of epistemic veracity and moral responsibility to institutional entities and undermining the individual’s cognitive contribution.
Essentially, individuals assume the role of biological automatons as the price for developing a comprehensive social theory of cognition. Much like Skinner’s behaviorist effort to explain that if external stimuli relate to mental phenomena which relate to a given reaction to said external stimuli, science can do away with the mental phenomena. This can be explained by the following argument form:
P1) If there is an external stimulus, then there is a mental phenomenon.
P2) If there is a mental phenomenon, then there is a behavioral reaction.
P3) There is an external stimulus.
C) External stimuli cause behavioral reactions.
Though the argument is valid, it makes a strong leap from premise one to the conclusion in asserting that external stimuli alone are a sufficient condition for all behavioral reactions. There are various implications in the argument, but I will highlight two. 1) The direct link between external stimuli and behavior renders mental activity an epiphenomenon—an effect without causal influence—of stimulus-biological interaction. 2) If one accepts that mental phenomena are epiphenomena—as one must to maintain the integrity of the argument—one must also accept the metaphysical model of a materialistic, biologically determined worldview.
Both behaviorists and social theorists of cognition reduce mental phenomena to environmentally shaped processes. The same can be said of enactivism with respect to social institutions like the court of law: When one engages with the legal system, the coupling between the individual and legal system enables one to make ethically based value judgements, since there are preestablished norms already contained within the parameters of the system. Thus, even novel legal cases which require complex analysis are determined by a sophisticated statistical analysis of prior precedents and current norms. Hence, one might posit an important metaphysical question: Is it the purpose of social theories of cognition to understand human thought, language, and behavior or to classify them as the inert byproducts of the environment?
When one considers the coalescence of Haslanger and Gallagher’s worldviews, institutional entities become harbingers of truth. Individuals at once depend upon institutions of culture, society, and politics for epistemological guidance while constituting the populace which proliferates its dogma. The situation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy of which Haslanger warns. The individual is embedded in a configuration of various social structures which enculturate a worldview through a lack of diverse thought. Accordingly, the individual herself becomes complicit in the systematized prejudices that accompany their learned normative principles. Their thoughts, intentions, and actions become an extension of groupthink such that to question the cultural technē they uphold could be viewed as malicious, which can lead to real-world consequences. For example, one might consider the emergence of cancel culture and censorship on media platforms as tools to combat narratives which threaten established norms. Thus, in an effort to remain in good standing, there takes place a dissolution of selfhood, autonomy, and accountability—the individual must preserve the collective to preserve her sense of self.
Yet, despite the slippery slope one traverses when accepting such a worldview, there is a viable means by which collective moral responsibility can reconcile with an individualist account. Seumas Miller presents an account of moral responsibility that begins at the individual level.
On this view collective entities, for example, social groups and organizations, have collective moral responsibility only in the sense that the individual human persons who constitute such entities have individual moral responsibility, either individually or jointly; collective entities as such do not have moral responsibility. (176)
On Miller’s view, one can ascribe responsibility to the collective. However, to do so, one must be able to provide evidence of shared intentional action that satisfies an end shared by two or more individuals of the group. Miller presents an account of collective responsibility that is premised upon joint action.
Roughly speaking, two or more individuals perform a joint action if each of them intentionally performs an individual action, but does so with the true belief that in so doing they will jointly realize an end which each of them has. (177)
Understandably, one might be skeptical that an individualist account of collective responsibility might encourage logical foul play. Accordingly, it is prudent to put such concerns to rest. Miller provides numerous examples of the moral ambiguity enabled by an individualist account. He explains a situation in which two gunmen take the life of a third man. Both gunmen inflict wounds that, alone, would be fatal to the third man. Then, the question is proposed: who is at fault? Through a strictly individualist perspective, it would be incredibly difficult to determine which individual is at fault. However, through the principle of joint action, it is easily determined that both gunmen fired shots that would prove fatal. Hence, both men performed an intended action that contributed to a shared end: the death of the third man. Therefore, both men are equally responsible for the death of the third man. This perspective is beneficial in the sense that it affords both culprits the right to autonomy while nonetheless effectively determining that their end was mutually undertaken.
III. Social Determinism and the Erosion of Selfhood
It is difficult to contend that culture and the social setting in which one is situated do not contribute to thoughts, intentions, and subsequently, actions. However, to what extent an individual maintains cognitive dominion over these factors deserves careful reflection. Haslanger’s assertion leads one to believe that the social structure in which one is raised programs the individual with culturally established proclivities and prejudices. This process of enculturation takes place on a foundational level such that the individual is often unaware of behaviors that they might otherwise resist. The individual undergoes a process of mindshaping, which is crucial for establishing coordination between oneself and the other individuals situated in a social setting. Haslanger explains,
We encourage and reinforce patterns of behaviour that facilitate coordination and discourage those that don’t. So, in contrast to the standard individualist model, sociality does not begin when psychologically mature individuals undertake joint action. Rather, our mental lives are shaped to enable us to fluently engage in the social practices of our milieu, and we are held accountable in light of the social meanings that support the terms of coordination. (13)
It appears that Haslanger contends that an individual’s primary behavioral objective is to be understood within the parameters of their social setting—that one engages in a behavior that is intrinsically morally good or bad is a secondary concern. Haslanger might reply that the individual is unaware of the potentially negative moral value ascribed to their action. Instead, they are simply behaving within the framework of their acquired cultural norms. The problem with this response is that it subjects the individual to a socially deterministic worldview—the individual loses agency and becomes a cog in the wheel of collective intention.
Similarly, Gallagher’s assertions further perpetuate the matter. As previously mentioned, on the enactivist account, collectives and institutions come to be viewed as sovereign entities entitled to moral considerability. Such entities are often considered epistemological sources from which individual agents acquire insight in novel circumstances. Furthermore, they enable cognitive processes that would otherwise be unavailable to the individual. Thus, it is held that these entities create, shape, and guide thought and action when individuals act through an institutional framework. When coupled with Haslanger’s theory of cognition as a social skill, one can assemble a clear picture of social determinism: social structures are constituted by institutions which are, in their own right, epistemological sources; the individual coordinates behavior to be understood within the framework of their social structure; hence, the individual exhibits behavior programmed through institutional mindshaping rather than the individual’s willed intentions or beliefs.
The socially determined worldview attempts to explain and identify the source of various maladies of the contemporary world such as systemic racism, sexism, alcoholism, and drug addiction. Historically, these afflictions have condemned individuals for the negative repercussions they elicit while social determinism examines the extent to which society deserves to be held responsible instead. However, in the process of ascribing carte blanche to the social structures that constitute society, social determinism does away with any semblance of autonomy. Not only is the agent reduced to an appendage of the hive mind, but they also become incapable of transcending their prejudices.
IV. Reclaiming Autonomy
If theories of social cognition, such as those posited by Haslanger and Gallagher, yield the socially determined agent, then it is sensible to explore the viability of ascribing moral accountability back into the hands of the individual. To reiterate, I do not deny that social structures and culture contribute to and shape individual identity. However, I hold that the extent to which an individual maintains accountability over the societal influences or pressures that shape their intentions, beliefs, and actions is determined by self-reflection. A socially determined worldview enables the individual to ascribe blame to society for their shortcomings and complicity in discriminatory social structures. They relinquish autonomy in exchange for immunity from the systemically prejudiced behaviors in which they actively partake. The socially determined agent presses their boot upon the oppressed and proclaims, Don’t blame me; society made me this way. Likewise, the oppressed agent lacks the sovereignty to break the chains binding them to systemic injustice.
Social theories of cognition posit that the way to battle institutional injustice is to counter with institutional virtue. Unfortunately, to do so is to engage with the opposite side of the same coin—the same structures that rob individual autonomy. Instead, the individual may reclaim autonomy by reflecting upon the beliefs and intentions that occupy their cognitive processes and hold these invasions in a critical light. Their self-accountability enables autonomy—as they accept the world and its circumstances as their responsibility, they begin to reclaim the self-determination of which they have been robbed. One might accuse such a perspective of advocating egocentrism, but this is far from the case. Instead, a disposition of critical self-reflection is necessary to reinforce equitable behavior toward the whole of one’s community. The individual’s goal is to achieve happiness through the pursuit of the good. Nevertheless, the good remains a moving target. Hence, it is imperative that the individual maintains a self-scrutinizing perspective to stay the course.
It benefits my critique of Haslanger’s and Gallagher’s positions to consider an extreme acceptance of their views and discern whether it is feasible for one to maintain or toreclaim autonomy in such an environment. That is, suppose one is deeply entwined in a web of social norms and institutional knowledge such that one is innocently unaware that one’s thoughts, beliefs, and actions are guided by a framework permeated by negative ideology. It follows that one would be enculturated by the beliefs of one’s social structure from birth: one is raised by parents and a community which operates through a set of norms one deems not only acceptable but ethical and virtuous. A child progresses through various developmental stages in which she acquires language and behavior that is consistent with her community and comes to know these features of herself as natural components of her character. Throughout adolescence, and as most youths do, she partakes in rebellious actions and receives negative feedback which reinforces the norms of her community members. As she reaches adulthood, she is ascribed moral accountability for her actions and sets out to encounter the world as an individual agent, all the while intrinsically shaped by her upbringing and social structure.
From the assertions of Haslanger and Gallagher, it would follow that the individual remains beholden to the socio-cultural milieu of her upbringing and cultivates a social circle that affirms similar beliefs and behavior. However, there are several shortcomings with such a vision. First, it does not consider the many aberrations that occur in the scope of one’s life such as work, the news cycle, the loss of a loved one, romantic engagements, and so on. Particularly in contemporary society, at every turn, one is confronted by perspectives that challenge one’s preconceptions of the way things ought to be. One need only acknowledge a contrasting perspective to confront the uncertainty of their so closely held dogma. The world is not an industry of premanufacture persons, but a crucible of change compelling individuals to choose who they will become. It is by nature of the world’s lack of hegemony that leaders, artists, and visionaries emerge to challenge the status quo and inspire society to reconsider its prejudices.
Second, in a metaphysical sense, accepting Haslanger and Gallagher’s assertions entails that novel thought or action cannot emerge without novel external stimuli. That is, there must be something that prompts thought, action, and behavior. This is troublesome when one considers a simple thought experiment: suppose one is resting at home on the couch watching television and is struck by the realization that they have left the stove running downstairs in the kitchen. It is exceedingly difficult to attribute the emergence of this thought to external stimuli in the form of a causal chain leading to the realization without reducing the event to determinism. It may be more feasible to acknowledge that a stream of consciousness—a steady flow of conscious and subconscious activity—prompts the recollection, realization, and genesis of novel mental phenomena which are causally relevant in the formation of thought, behavior, and action. This would preserve Haslanger and Gallagher’s assertions that individuals are influenced by external stimuli in thought, behavior, and action while also allowing for individual autonomy in situations where there is little to no external influence.
Although it is difficult to outline a universal developmental theory of psychology, many psychologists have attempted to do so, providing a range of ages that correspond to particular stages of development. I do not go so far, but I hold that there is a cognitive threshold at which the individual acquires or is expected to uphold a sense of accountability for their thoughts, beliefs, and actions. While presently this threshold might be imperceptible or unquanti-fiable due to the limitations of neuroscience and linguistics, I believe it lies in the rudiments of language acquisition. If one were to scrutinize the various developmental theories of psychology, one would quickly discern that the ranges provided for particular stages typically cor-respond to those provided by other theorists. That is, as a child, an individual develops through rudimentary stages which, in succession, increase in complexity until one reaches the final stage. I assert that it is the final stage of development in any given individual that one passes the cognitive threshold at which accountability is ascribed to the agent except in cases of serious developmental, biological, or traumatic aberrations.
As soon as a child acquires the ability to speak, she begins communicating and abstracting and thereby constructing and understanding the world. Furthermore, language aids in the cons-truction of an internal narrative—the way in which an individual chronologizes and catalogues her life experiences. In fact, some studies show that over a quarter of one’s conscious life involves active engagement in inner speech (Vicente and Manrique 211).
One might ask, why is inner speech such a powerful cognitive tool? The twentieth-century psychologist Lev Vygotsky posited that “language is first and foremost an external tool that not only serves to communicate thoughts but also to gain increasing control over one’s actions” (Vicente and Manrique 213). That is, before one acquires experience within a behavioral or ethical framework, one relies on informational assistance to appropriately carry out tasks. For instance, one often talks oneself through a task aloud; eventually, as proficiency is gained, the speech becomes internalized. Eventually, the process resembles the structure of inner speech in which most regularly engage.
A proponent of the socially determined worldview might object that speech is permeated with ideology—it brings a framework of socialization because it is the means through which socialization occurs. While language is most certainly a social tool shaped by the ideology of a particular social framework, the cognitive threshold enables the individual to utilize language—through their inner speech—in a self-reflective manner. The cognitive threshold is characterized by two main features: a fully developed version of inner speech⁴ and the awareness of oneself as socially embedded. Andy Clark makes the claim that “language is an external tool for control that we interiorize. By doing so, we can ‘objectify and contemplate our own thoughts’” (Vicente and Manrique 214). That is, the internalization of language through inner speech is the mechanism by which one focuses on one’s thoughts, which enables one to have better control over one’s actions.
It is prudent to explain how inner speech is used in self-reflection such that it aids in reclaiming autonomy. First, inner speech enables self-awareness through reflection on thoughts and mental states that may not be possible without it (Vicente and Manrique 214). This self-reflection subsequently affords one a critical perspective of one’s mental schematics with questions such as: Is this the right thing to do? Are these positive results? Do I really believe in this? Second, inner speech produces “a distance within the self” that is imperative for genuine self-reflection (214). One is able to take a figurative step back and assess an action, thought, or mental state to determine whether it is suitable for one’s intentions. While it is difficult to conclusively determine the functions of internal linguistic processes, it is apparent that they contribute to cognitive function as much as they contribute to one’s communicative abilities. That is, one’s ability to communicate within the framework of a social structure is largely dependent upon one’s ability to communicate the semantics of said framework to oneself.
It is also critical to explore the objection that inner speech, too, is compromised by the mechanisms of social determinism if the outward language one employs is acquired through the same ideologi-cal substructures. This assertion is quite troublesome to the redeeming qualities afforded by one’s internal language processes. However, unlike the language in which one engages when one converses out-wardly with those in their social circles, internalized language is not subjected to the scrutiny of outside forces. An analogy might help to contextualize what is meant by this: imagine a suburban neighborhood with finely manicured lawns, sidewalks, and streets. This façade of order is only maintained through the constant pruning of nature as it acts out against humanity’s attempt to tame it. As weeds grow in the cracks of the sidewalk, they are picked, as the grass rises, it is cut, and as potholes form, they are filled. Similarly, the language in which one outwardly engages is regularly pruned by their social circles to maintain order. However, where one cannot be monitored, interrupted, or censored, that is, one’s mind, the natural self takes shape. The forest of the self proliferates and grows wild to reflect the true nature of the individual ungoverned by institutional dogma or otherwise. To reiterate, this is achieved as one crosses the cognitive threshold which is constituted by a fully developed version of inner speech and the awareness that one is an individual embedded within a social framework.
Thus, it is feasible to consider that the individual does, in fact, maintain control over the ideologically oppressive behaviors in which she is urged to partake. One’s innate ability of critical reflection enables one to take accountability for the influences that shape one’s cognitive landscape. By doing so, one reclaims one’s autonomy and engages with the world as a sovereign entity.
Abstract
Social theories of cognition acknowledge the importance of the joint factors that shape the individual. However, in the process of minimizing the role of the individual in social contexts, social theories of cognition challenge the role of autonomy and agency. Does institutional knowledge supervene upon individual knowledge? Can one overcome the ideological structures of one’s upbringing and reclaim one’s autonomy in the face of socially deterministic forces? This paper explores the dangers of social determinism created by social theories of cognition and contends that one can reclaim autonomy and agency through self-reflection. I will examine Sally Haslanger’s theory of cognition as a social skill; Sean Gallagher’s enactivist account of cognition, which affords moral considerability to social institutions; and Seamus Miller’s position, which considers an individualist account of collective responsibility. Lastly, I will present Lev Vygotsky’s research in developmental psychology and linguistics, which will help contextualize my assertion that autonomy can be reclaimed in the face of socially deterministic factors through the harnessing of inner speech.
¹ Haslanger uses this term to distinguish between the pejorative (oppressive ideology) and non-pejorative (cultural diversity) sense of ideology.
² Haslanger uses the term enculturation to encompass the process of acquiring and accepting the norms, beliefs, and practices of the culture in which one is embedded. Enculturation is deeply tied to understanding and navigating culture. For example, enculturation is how we understand certain social structures like gender and race, which are not simply categories but are shaped by norms and practices and ingrained in thought and behavior.
³Coupling suggests a relationship between an object or operation is coupled with an individual in which the individual is augmented such that they can engage in actions or thought processes that were previously not possible. Constitution suggests that when one is coupled with an object such as a notebook which is always available, used often, and contains trustworthy information, that the notebook constitutes some part of one’s memory store. See Adams and Aizawa (2010) for more.
⁴ This is characterized by an ability to engage in a quality of inner speech that imitates that of spoken language.
Works Cited
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